This paper examines the geo-political reaction to President Harry S. Truman's 1949 Inaugural Address, wherein he catalyzed post-war global development in the form of his Point Four program. Truman proposed sharing American scientific and technical expertise, ostensibly aimed at reducing or eliminating poverty in the developing world. Newspaper accounts and analysis of internal CIA documents reveal domestic and international responses to the policy initiative. Predictably, these responses mostly varied along early Cold War ideological lines. Examining Truman's plan and other anti-communist American policies in the late 1940s reveals that although global development may have been a laudable effect of the plan, the primary aim was to prevent communism from spreading to countries viewed as vulnerable to subversion. The Cold War imperatives behind the plan seem to have been either implicitly assumed or ignored in the historiography. A brief sampling of Cold War historians shows a lack of explicit attention to Truman's initiative.
The Second World War left the developed world shattered. European states that had formerly been colonial powers were left fiscally desperate. With this economic backdrop, the world moved into the Cold War era. The United States, the only major Western power to come out of the war economically stronger than when it entered, was pitted against the Soviet Union, former wartime ally of the United States and the dominant power in Europe, in an ideological struggle of capitalism against communism. The determination of the United States and its allies to prevent the global spread of communism was at the heart of the Cold War. However, the influence of communism needed to be prevented by non-military means, given the destructive nature of the Second World War and the nuclear age that the world entered upon the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The United States employed its economic supremacy as a non-military tactic through programs such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In January of 1949, President Harry S. Truman gave his inaugural address, wherein he elucidated the Point Four Program. This speech is considered the jumping-off point of international development in the post-war world. Reactions to the address varied along international ideological lines. When Point Four is considered alongside the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the policy of containment adopted by the United States, it becomes apparent that its aim was in line with these other early American Cold War policies: the prevention of the global spread of communist influence. This bold program's primary aim was to halt Soviet expansion-improving people's lives internationally was secondary.
After Franklin Delano Roosevelt died suddenly in 1945, Truman served out the remainder of Roosevelt's term and ran for re-election, winning the presidential race in 1948. Therefore, his first inaugural address was in 1949, although he had been president for almost four years. The Marshall Plan-providing a massive influx of American capital to rebuild Europe after the Second World War-was already underway, which addressed European post-war recovery. Truman's inaugural address proposed aid programs for nations outside the European region, offering American scientific techniques and technical expertise. In a marked departure from his Truman Doctrine in 1947, wherein he only explicitly mentioned communism once, 2 Truman's inaugural address left no doubt that communism was the new enemy of the free world. Truman attempted to delegitimize communism by branding it a "false philosophy": one that espouses man "is so weak and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself" and subjects individuals to "forced labor as the chattel of the state."
3 By delineating the differences between communism and democracy, Truman had clearly framed communism in opposition to American values.
Truman's rhetoric, regarding the differences between democracy and communism, established the basis of support for four policies: (1) supporting the United Nations; (2) continuing to support European economic recovery; (3) aiding countries in maintaining their freedom; and, most importantly as these courses of action pertain to global development, (4) Reactions from "underdeveloped countries" in the "non-Soviet world" were also surprisingly positive-from as far away geographically and politically as China. One commentator reportedly stated "that the Chinese Communists could draw some comfort from the President's speech." 21 Similarly, reaction from "underdeveloped countries" in the "non-Soviet world" was also positive. In Latin America, for example, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Haiti all declared their interest in Point Four. 22 Reaction from parts of the world in the Soviet sphere of influence, however, challenged the depiction of Point Four as an altruistic American policy. Radio addresses in Soviet-controlled Berlin painted Truman's speech as "abusive, in unmeasured terms, to the world's progressive forces and to those aiming at the maintenance of peace" and that Truman was trying to "conceal U.S. imperialism's program of aggression." 25 Hungarian radio declared that
Truman's pledges of peace and freedom contrasted with his continued attacks against communism and the Soviet Union; Point Four was nothing more than "the large flood of capital into colonial territories, the targets…the British, French, and Dutch colonial territories in Southeast Asia."
26
In Leipzig, Germany, a commentator compared the speech with those of Hitler, in that they both "proclaim grandiose world programs to disguise…ambitions of world rule."
27
Romanian radio programs theorized that the ultimate subjects of Truman's address were massive arms expenditures, and expansive colonization. 28 The CIA noted that the Polish representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council decried the program as an American machination to influence "the American Century through political maneuvering, profiteering, and espionage." 29 As laudatory as the responses were throughout the non-Soviet world, the reactions from within the Soviet orbit were equally scathing and dismissive. They saw Truman's plan as nothing more than an imperialist, expansionist, capitalist scheme to oppress the developing world, and enrich American coffers. In contrast to the vitriol coming from Soviet satellite states, initial reaction from Moscow was more cautious and muted in the aftermath of Truman's speech. One week after Truman's inaugural speech, the Kremlin had only issued one brief summation of the speech. It made no specific mention of the content of the speech, and excluded Truman's four points. 30 The CIA characterized the statement as no different from normal Soviet attacks: Three years after initially adopting a patient approach to the Point Four program, the Soviet Union changed course and began rejecting the plan. While the frequency of Soviet radio addresses on the subject was minimal, they maintained that:
1. Aid is a weapon of U.S. imperialist expansion; 2. Aid is being forced on the underdeveloped countries; 3. The Truman plan is a device for gaining control of raw materials, particularly strategic resources; 4. Aid is being used as a pretext for interference in internal affairs; 5. American investors are exploiting the plan to increase the export of capital; 6. The economies of countries receiving aid are deteriorating rapidly; 7. Aid is connected with aggressive imperialist plans.
34
The official Soviet response then paralleled that of its client states, in that the USSR now explicitly condemned Plan was a policy successor to the Truman Doctrine, it was also a predecessor to Truman's Point Four. The similarities between the two programs were not lost on possible recipients of American aid under Point Four. In a report containing initial reactions to Point Four, the CIA outlined that while positive, initial reactions "indicate that the most common approach to 'Point Four' will be an attempt to turn the emphasis of the program from technical to financial assistance on the order of ERP." 41 The Marshall Plan entailed a sudden, massive influx of American capital into Europe in order to improve quality of life, and thereby prevent the spread of communism. Similarly, Point Four involved distributing American aid, albeit planned in technical assistance as opposed to financial aid, in order to bolster standards of living throughout poverty-stricken parts of the globe. While Point Four makes no specific mention of using this approach to prevent these areas from embracing communism, Truman's anti-communist rhetoric at the beginning of the speech and his statement about poor people being a threat leaves very little doubt that Point Four aimed to keep Western democracy and capitalism safe. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were both aligned with containment, another American foreign policy tenet in the early Cold War. First uttered by American policy-maker George F. Kennan in July 1947, the basic goal of containment was to stop the USSR from using its postwar power and prestige to influence the international order. 42 In order to prevent that eventuality, Kennan expansion. In addition to the aims, the geographic focus of Point Four also matched Kennan's policy of containment. In August of 1948, Kennan identified areas of the globe that the United States could not afford to have fall under hostile influence. These areas included the west coast of Africa, the countries of South America "from the bulge down", the Middle East as far east as Iran, and the Philippines. 45 That list neatly overlapped with the areas of the globe that Truman targeted through Point Four a short time later. The historiography surrounding Point Four seems to be in agreement on the intentions of the program, but an explicit examination of Truman's motives is difficult to find. Gilbert Rist pays serious attention to Truman's inaugural address in his book on the history of development. He theorizes that Point Four was the keystone of the development era following the Second World War. 46 He also examines the proposal in a geopolitical framework that suggests that Point Four was aimed at stifling global communism. Rist posits that Point Four was "a generous proposal that claimed to be beyond the ideological divide between capitalism and communism. The key to prosperity and happiness was increased production." 47 Although he
situates it outside of a divide between the two Cold War ideologies, Rist's analysis seems to align with Truman's goals, though both were definitely nestled inside the Cold War struggle. If increased production makes peoples more prosperous and content, and states suffering poverty and deprivation are more susceptible to communism, then increasing happiness and prosperity alleviates the danger of a state in the developing world falling prey to communism. Rist, in further descriptions of Point Four and its impact on the history of development, makes no other direct reference to the policy's possible Cold War motivations. Indirectly though, he dissects the discourse used by Truman, and ultimately posits that Point Four "primarily served the interests of the world's most powerful nation" while claiming to have "only the common good at heart."
48 Given the oppositional stances the United States Despite couching the speech in anti-Soviet rhetoric at the beginning, he was still met with some domestic skepticism, both in the press and inside Congress. In the end, his support, seemingly bi-partisan, won out and funding for Point Four was folded into the allotment for the Marshall Plan. Internationally, reaction to his speech varied predictably along ideological lines. Countries allied to the United States, as well as those in the developing world that were not tied to the Soviet Union, reacted positively and envisioned benefits for individual states as well as the global order. Meanwhile, states aligned with the USSR reacted negatively, portraying Truman's plan as a step toward American global domination, a colonial, expansionist, capitalist scheme out to acquire raw resources, and an attempt to prop up colonial enterprises, among other derisive reactions. The Soviet Union itself, while initially remaining tempered and moderate in its response to Truman's address, within three years had changed its position and decried Point Four with themes similar to those put forth by its satellite states in the immediate aftermath of Truman's address.
Though the historiography surrounding Point Four only implicitly discusses the Cold War motivations behind the program, authors in development and Cold War history seem to be in agreement on the underlying objective. Rist, Williams, and Meier all discuss the primacy of American economic interests, and consider the antithetical nature of communism and capitalism during the Cold War: in order for capitalism to succeed, communism had to fail. Point Four's stated aim of increasing prosperity throughout the world not only meant increased markets for American exports, but also less fertile ground for communism to flourish. Point Four aligned with economic interests, echoed the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, and fit squarely under the policy of containment. Catalyzing international development was a result of the President's inaugural address, but for Truman, it was a means to an end. This bold decision, a facet of larger American strategic thought during the Cold War, aimed primarily to contain and weaken the Soviet Union. Improving lives around the globe was a secondary consideration. The broader implications of Point Four bear further scrutiny. While Truman's policy appears in the history of modern global development, historians seem to have paid scant attention to its place in American foreign policy in the early Cold War, especially as a function of containment. This paper contributes to the existing literature, and further analysis of Truman's policy will be useful in the interpretation of the history of global development.
